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Rate Regulation, Safety Incentives, and Loss Growth in Workers' Compensation Insurance*
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Abstract(back to top)
We analyze the relationship between insurance rate regulation, inflationary cost surges, and incentives for loss control using state‐level data on workers' compensation insurance for 24 states during 1984–90. Regulators often responded to rapid loss growth during this period by denying rate increases or approving increases that were less than initially requested by insurers. We test whether rate suppression increased loss growth by distorting incentives for loss control. Our regressions indicate a positive and statistically reliable relationship between loss growth and lagged measures of regulatory price constraints, suggesting that rate regulation increased the frequency and/or severity of employee injuries.
Bibliographic Information(back to top)
- Rate Regulation, Safety Incentives, and Loss Growth in Workers' Compensation Insurance
- Scott E. Harrington and Patricia M. Danzon
- The Journal of Business
- Vol. 73, No. 4 (October 2000) (pp. 569-595)
Notes and References(back to top)
This item contains 1 note(s).
Notes
* We thank Richard Butler, Robert Klein, John Ruser, and John Worrall for helpful comments and the American Enterprise Institute for financial support.
Items Citing this Item (back to top)
2 item(s) in JSTOR cite this item
- Hong Zou, Mike B. Adams, Mike J. BuckleVol. 70, No. 2 (Jun., 2003) pp. 289-314Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3519918
- Patricia M. Danzon and Scott E. HarringtonVol. 44, No. 1 (April 2001) pp. 1-36Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/320270