You are not currently logged in.
Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Monitoring and Pay
Magnus Allgulin and Tore Ellingsen
Journal of Labor Economics
Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 201-216
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Society of Labor Economists and the NORC at the University of Chicago
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/338214
Page Count: 16
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result is not generally true. As monitoring becomes cheaper, a given effort level will be implemented with more monitoring and less pay, but it is typically also optimal to implement a higher effort. The article provides conditions under which the latter “scale effect” dominates the former “substitution effect” and vice versa. If the ease of monitoring varies across occupations, the model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the wage level and workers’ rents.
© 2002 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.