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Career Concerns in Teams

Emmanuelle Auriol, Guido Friebel and Lambros Pechlivanos
Journal of Labor Economics
Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 289-307
DOI: 10.1086/338240
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/338240
Page Count: 19
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Career Concerns in Teams
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Abstract

We investigate how changes in the commitment power of a principal affect cooperation among agents who work in a team. When the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents’ innate abilities, workers have career concerns. Then, unless the principal can commit herself to long‐term wage contracts, an implicit sabotage incentive emerges. Agents become reluctant to help their teammates. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal offers more collectively oriented incentive schemes. Temporary workers, though, are not affected by the sabotage effect, and their incentives are more individually oriented.

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