You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 110, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 382-393
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/338742
Page Count: 12
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Financial markets, Standard of living, Politics, Property rights, Charity, Transfer payments, Public policy, Consumer preferences, Net income, Poverty
Were these topics helpful?See somethings inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
Why do democratic societies often impose legal restrictions that render various assets or entitlements inalienable to the individual? The explanation proposed here is that these constraints arise as an institutional response against financial markets that, in a sense, work “too well.” That is, I demonstrate how a well‐functioning financial market can potentially work against a social policy designed to ensure a basic minimum standard of living for all types of individuals. Inalienable property rights and debt constraints emerge as a natural institutional response to the improvident tendencies of some members of society when a majority of individuals share a common distaste for neighborhood squalor.
© 2002 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.