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Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism

Ingo Brigandt
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 70, No. 5, Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science AssociationPart I: Contributed PapersEdited by Sandra D. Mitchell (December 2003), pp. 1305-1316
DOI: 10.1086/377409
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/377409
Page Count: 12
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Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism
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Abstract

Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. Based on the idea that the species concept is a so‐called investigative kind concept, it is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.

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