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Discussion Note: Making Sense of Understanding*
Henk W. de Regt
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 71, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 98-109
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/381415
Page Count: 12
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J.D. Trout (2002) presents a challenge to all theorists of scientific explanation who appeal to the notion of understanding. Trout denounces understanding as irrelevant, if not dangerous, from an epistemic perspective and he endorses a radically objectivist view of explanation instead. In this note I accept Trout's challenge. I criticize his argument and defend a non‐objectivist, pragmatic conception of understanding that is epistemically relevant.
Copyright 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.