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Journal Article

The Effect of Piracy on the Market Penetration of Subscription Software

Ernan Haruvy, Vijay Mahajan and Ashutosh Prasad
The Journal of Business
Vol. 77, No. S2 (April 2004), pp. S81-S107
DOI: 10.1086/381520
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/381520
Page Count: 27
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Abstract

Software piracy is not necessarily harmful to a software firm seeking to launch a new product. When strategically managed through the use of price and protection measures, piracy establishes the initial adopters of the software, who in turn influence other users to buy the product. We examine the role of piracy in affecting the adoption of subscription software products. We present an individual‐level model in an adaptive population setting intended to determine the price‐protection mix that maximizes the discounted profit stream over the life of the software. An extension for nonsubscription software is also discussed.

Notes and References

This item contains 62 references.

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