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Discussion: A Defense of Bechtel and Mundale*

Mark B. Couch
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 71, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 198-204
DOI: 10.1086/383011
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/383011
Page Count: 7
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Discussion: A Defense of Bechtel and Mundale*
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Abstract

Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur.

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