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David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance
Barry Loewer
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 71, No. 5, Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science AssociationPart II: Symposia PapersEdited by Sandra D. Mitchell (December 2004), pp. 1115-1125
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
DOI: 10.1086/428015
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/428015
Page Count: 11
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Abstract
The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual “interpretations of probability” give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance” he described a framework for representing single case objective chances, showed how they are connected to subjective credences, and sketched a novel account what they are within his Humean account of scientific laws. Here I will describe these contributions and add a little to them.
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Copyright 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.