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The Structure of Scientific Theory Change: Models versus Privileged Formulations*

James Mattingly
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 72, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 365-389
DOI: 10.1086/432428
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/432428
Page Count: 25
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The Structure of Scientific Theory Change: Models versus Privileged Formulations*
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Abstract

Two views of scientific theories dominated the philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the syntactic view of the logical empiricists and the semantic view of their successors. I show that neither view is adequate to provide a proper understanding of the connections that exist between theories at different times. I outline a new approach, a hybrid of the two, that provides the right structural connection between earlier and later theories, and that takes due account of the importance of the mathematical models of a theory (the semantic component) and of the various distinct formulations that pick out these models (the syntactic component).

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