If You Use a Screen Reader
This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Journal Article
Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements
James D. Miller
The Journal of Legal Studies
Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 69-94
Published by: The University of Chicago Press for The University of Chicago Law School
DOI: 10.1086/467989
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/467989
Page Count: 26
You can always find the topics here!
Topics: Lotteries, Plaintiffs, Defendants, Trials, Litigation, Settlement offers, Betting, Plea bargains, Information asymmetry, Verdicts
Were these topics helpful?
See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Abstract
Abstract This article shows that a testable implication of many game theoretic models of litigation is that litigating parties should incorporate lotteries into their settlement agreements. The article focuses on how litigating parties could use lotteries to overcome problems caused by asymmetric information. Also discussed is why mutually optimistic parties would have incentives to use lotteries even if their use would make the parties worse off. The article briefly explores why decision makers would benefit from using lotteries in situations involving plea bargains, child custody disputes, and the application of the exclusionary rule.
Page Thumbnails
-
1
-
2
-
3
-
4
-
5
-
6
-
7
-
8
-
9
-
10
-
11
-
12
-
13
-
14
-
15
-
16
-
17
-
18
-
19
-
20
-
21
-
22
-
23
-
24
-
25
-
26
© 1997 by The University of Chicago.