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Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation

Karsten Jeske
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 114, No. 3 (June 2006), pp. 576-593
DOI: 10.1086/503755
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/503755
Page Count: 18
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Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation
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Abstract

The risk of repudiation plays a central role in determining the size of international capital flows. In this paper I compare a centralized arrangement for international debt, where only governments borrow and lend internationally, with a decentralized arrangement, where individual borrowers have access to international capital markets. I show that a centralized setup allows more international risk sharing and higher welfare than a decentralized setup. That is, there is a positive role for government regulation of international borrowing.

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