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Well‐Ordered Science: Evidence for Use
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 73, No. 5, Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science AssociationPart II: Symposia PapersEdited by Miriam Solomon (December 2006), pp. 981-990
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/518803
Page Count: 10
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This article agrees with Philip Kitcher that we should aim for a well‐ordered science, one that answers the right questions in the right ways. Crucial to this is to address questions of use: Which scientific account is right for which system in which circumstances? This is a difficult question: evidence that may support a scientific claim in one context may not support it in another. Drawing on examples in physics and other sciences, this article argues that work on the warrant of theories in philosophy of science needs to change. Emphasis should move from the warrant of theories in the abstract to questions of evidence for use.
Copyright 2006 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.