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How Bohm’s Theory Solves the Measurement Problem
Peter J. Lewis
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 74, No. 5, Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science AssociationPart I: Contributed PapersEdited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander (December 2007), pp. 749-760
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/525619
Page Count: 12
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I examine recent arguments based on functionalism that claim to show that Bohm’s theory fails to solve the measurement problem, or if it does so, it is only because it reduces to a form of the many‐worlds theory. While these arguments reveal some interesting features of Bohm’s theory, I contend that they do not undermine the distinctive Bohmian solution to the measurement problem.
Copyright 2007 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.