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The Meta‐inductivist’s Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume’s Problem*
Gerhard Schurz
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 75, No. 3 (July 2008), pp. 278-305
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
DOI: 10.1086/592550
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/592550
Page Count: 28
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Abstract
This article suggests a ‘best alternative’ justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta‐induction. The meta‐inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta‐inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta‐induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object‐induction based on the experiences in our world.
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Copyright 2008 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.