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The Resilience of Computationalism
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 77, No. 5 (December 2010), pp. 852-861
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/656549
Page Count: 10
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Computationalism—the view that cognition is computation—has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y, and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. In this article, I explain why computationalism has survived these objections. To adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, I will conclude that we need a better account of computation.
Copyright 2010 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.