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The Pitfalls of Microphysical Realism
Muhammad Ali Khalidi
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 78, No. 5 (December 2011), pp. 1156-1164
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/662285
Page Count: 9
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Microphysical realism is the position that the only real entities and properties are found at the most fundamental level of nature. In this article, I challenge microphysical realism concerning properties and natural kinds. One argument for microphysical realism about entities, the “nothing-but argument,” does not apply to properties and kinds. Another argument, the “causal exclusion argument,” cannot be sustained in light of modern physics. Moreover, this argument leads to an objection against microphysical realism, based on the “illusoriness of macroproperties.” Another objection is based on the possibility that there is no fundamental level but a “bottomless pit.”
Copyright 2011 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.