Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason
Vol. 122, No. 3 (April 2012), pp. 489-515
Published by: University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/664749
Page Count: 27
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This essay defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I argue for the skeptical view that putative reasons of the wrong kind are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes but not reasons for those attitudes. The argument turns on the transmission of reasons: the familiar fact that there is often reason for one action or attitude because there is reason for another. I argue that putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in a different way to the right kind of reasons and that this fact is best explained by the skeptical view.
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