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Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating
Benjamin Anders Levinstein
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 79, No. 3 (July 2012), pp. 413-424
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666064
Page Count: 12
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Leitgeb and Pettigrew argue that (1) agents should minimize the expected inaccuracy of their beliefs and (2) inaccuracy should be measured via the Brier score. They show that in certain diachronic cases, these claims require an alternative to Jeffrey Conditionalization. I claim that this alternative is an irrational updating procedure and that the Brier score, and quadratic scoring rules generally, should be rejected as legitimate measures of inaccuracy.
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