Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Push the Button

Arif Ahmed
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 79, No. 3 (July 2012), pp. 386-395
DOI: 10.1086/666065
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666065
Page Count: 10
  • Get Access
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Push the Button
Preview not available

Abstract

The article discusses a well-known type of counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT), in which CDT recommends an option that probably causes the best outcome while itself being evidence that it causes the worst. Intuition disagrees. Many philosophers accept that this justifies either modifying CDT or dropping it altogether. I argue to the contrary that (a) if intuition is right about this case, then transitivity of preference must be violated in another, but (b) this violation is untenable. I conclude that CDT stands.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
386
    386
  • Thumbnail: Page 
387
    387
  • Thumbnail: Page 
388
    388
  • Thumbnail: Page 
389
    389
  • Thumbnail: Page 
390
    390
  • Thumbnail: Page 
391
    391
  • Thumbnail: Page 
392
    392
  • Thumbnail: Page 
393
    393
  • Thumbnail: Page 
394
    394
  • Thumbnail: Page 
395
    395