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The Semantic View, If Plausible, Is Syntactic
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 80, No. 3 (July 2013), pp. 475-478
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/671077
Page Count: 4
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Halvorson argues that the semantic view of theories leads to absurdities. Glymour shows how to inoculate the semantic view against Halvorson’s criticisms, namely, by making it into a syntactic view of theories. I argue that this modified semantic-syntactic view cannot do the philosophical work that the original “language-free” semantic view was supposed to do.
Copyright 2013 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.