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How Reasons Bear on Intentions
Vol. 124, No. 1 (October 2013), pp. 84-100
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/671388
Page Count: 17
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This article is a critical response to Mark Schroeder’s recent “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.” In this essay, Schroeder claims that it is possible for a right-kind reason to bear on an intention without that reason bearing on the object of the intention. I examine Schroeder’s central argument for this claim and conclude that it does not deliver the result Schroeder desires. My critique turns on explicating and extending some of G. E. M. Anscombe’s remarks in Intention on the structure of practical reasoning.
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