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Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk
Matthew J. Brown
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 80, No. 5 (December 2013), pp. 829-839
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/673720
Page Count: 11
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Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science.
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