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Journal Article

Valuing Disability, Causing Disability

Elizabeth Barnes
Ethics
Vol. 125, No. 1 (October 2014), pp. 88-113
DOI: 10.1086/677021
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/677021
Page Count: 26
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Abstract

Disability rights activists often claim that disability is not—by itself—something that makes disabled people worse off. A popular objection to such a view of disability is this: were it correct, it would make it permissible to cause disability and impermissible to cause nondisability (or impermissible to “cure” disability, to use the value-laden term). The aim of this article is to show that these twin objections don’t succeed.
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