Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution

Jordi Guillen, Claire Macher, Mathieu Merzéréaud, Jean Boncoeur and Olivier Guyader
Marine Resource Economics
Vol. 30, No. 2 (April 2015), pp. 123-138
DOI: 10.1086/679970
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/679970
Page Count: 16
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Cite this Item
Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution
Preview not available

Abstract

AbstractMost fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
1
    1
  • Thumbnail: Page 
2
    2
  • Thumbnail: Page 
3
    3
  • Thumbnail: Page 
4
    4
  • Thumbnail: Page 
5
    5
  • Thumbnail: Page 
6
    6
  • Thumbnail: Page 
7
    7
  • Thumbnail: Page 
8
    8
  • Thumbnail: Page 
9
    9
  • Thumbnail: Page 
10
    10
  • Thumbnail: Page 
11
    11
  • Thumbnail: Page 
12
    12
  • Thumbnail: Page 
13
    13
  • Thumbnail: Page 
14
    14
  • Thumbnail: Page 
15
    15
  • Thumbnail: Page 
16
    16