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Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution
Jordi Guillen, Claire Macher, Mathieu Merzéréaud, Jean Boncoeur and Olivier Guyader
Marine Resource Economics
Vol. 30, No. 2 (April 2015), pp. 123-138
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/679970
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Employee compensation, Economic rent, Fishery economics, Fishing, Sustainable fisheries management, Total costs, Labor costs, Sustainable management, Opportunity costs, Mortality
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AbstractMost fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions.
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