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Journal Article

Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond

J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
The Journal of Law & Economics
Vol. 57, No. S3, The Contributions of Robert Bork to Antitrust Economics (August 2014), pp. S145-S160
DOI: 10.1086/680347
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/680347
Page Count: 16
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Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond
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Abstract

AbstractAntitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain when exclusive dealing might possibly cause harm and have modeled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.

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