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Hypothesis Testing, “Dutch Book” Arguments, and Risk
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 82, No. 5 (December 2015), pp. 917-929
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/683341
Page Count: 13
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“Dutch Book” arguments and references to gambling theorems are typical in the debate between Bayesians and scientists committed to “classical” statistical methods. These arguments have rarely convinced non-Bayesian scientists to abandon certain conventional practices (like fixed-level null hypothesis significance testing), partially because many scientists feel that gambling theorems have little relevance to their research activities. In other words, scientists “don’t bet.” This article examines one attempt, by Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, to progress beyond such apparent stalemates by connecting “Dutch Book”–type mathematical results with principles actually endorsed by practicing experimentalists.
Copyright 2015 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.