Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:

login

Log in through your institution.

Hypothesis Testing, “Dutch Book” Arguments, and Risk

Daniel Malinsky
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 82, No. 5 (December 2015), pp. 917-929
DOI: 10.1086/683341
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/683341
Page Count: 13
  • More info
  • Cite this Item
Hypothesis Testing, “Dutch Book” Arguments, and Risk
Preview not available

Abstract

“Dutch Book” arguments and references to gambling theorems are typical in the debate between Bayesians and scientists committed to “classical” statistical methods. These arguments have rarely convinced non-Bayesian scientists to abandon certain conventional practices (like fixed-level null hypothesis significance testing), partially because many scientists feel that gambling theorems have little relevance to their research activities. In other words, scientists “don’t bet.” This article examines one attempt, by Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, to progress beyond such apparent stalemates by connecting “Dutch Book”–type mathematical results with principles actually endorsed by practicing experimentalists.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
1
    1
  • Thumbnail: Page 
2
    2
  • Thumbnail: Page 
3
    3
  • Thumbnail: Page 
4
    4
  • Thumbnail: Page 
5
    5
  • Thumbnail: Page 
6
    6
  • Thumbnail: Page 
7
    7
  • Thumbnail: Page 
8
    8
  • Thumbnail: Page 
9
    9
  • Thumbnail: Page 
10
    10
  • Thumbnail: Page 
11
    11
  • Thumbnail: Page 
12
    12
  • Thumbnail: Page 
13
    13