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Biological Individuality and Scientific Practice

Karen Kovaka
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 82, No. 5 (December 2015), pp. 1092-1103
DOI: 10.1086/683443
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/683443
Page Count: 12
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Biological Individuality and Scientific Practice
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Abstract

I consider the relationship between scientific practice and the philosophical debate surrounding biological individuality. I argue for the sensitivity account, on which biologists do not require a resolution to the individuality debate. This view puts me in disagreement with much of the literature on biological individuality, where it has become common to claim that there is a relationship of dependence between biologists’ conceptions of individuality and the quality of their empirical work.

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