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The Scope and the Grounds of Responsibility

Victor Tadros
New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal
Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 91-118
DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2008.11.1.91
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/nclr.2008.11.1.91
Page Count: 28
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The Scope and the Grounds of Responsibility
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Abstract

This essay is concerned with the relationship between the grounds of responsibility and their scope. The grounds of responsibility are provided by a theory that explains why we can be held responsible for our actions. They must meet various threats, the most prominent of which comes from determinism. The scope of responsibility determines the kinds of action that we can be held responsible for, such as intentional, reckless, negligent, or accidental actions. I defend a conception of responsibility that has expansive scope, in that it allows us to be responsible for things that we have no control over. I show how this expansive view might nevertheless rest on more traditional views about the grounds of responsibility and explore some if the institutional ramifications of the view.

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