Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:

login

Log in through your institution.

Aggregation with Cournot Competition: the Le Chatelier Samuelson Principle

Bertrand Koebel and François Laisney
Annals of Economics and Statistics
No. 115/116, SPECIAL ISSUE ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN NANOTECHNOLOGY AND OTHER HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (December 2014), pp. 343-360
Published by: GENES on behalf of ADRES
DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.343
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.343
Page Count: 18
  • More info
  • Cite this Item
Aggregation with Cournot Competition: the Le Chatelier Samuelson Principle
Preview not available

Abstract

This paper studies the aggregate substitution and expansion effects triggered by changes in input prices in a context where firms supply a homogeneous commodity and compete in quantities à la Cournot. We derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium and show that this condition also ensures that the Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle is satisfied in the aggregate at the Cournot equilibrium, although it may not be satisfied at the firm level. JEL: D21, D43 / KEY WORDS: Aggregation, Returns to Scale, Market Power, Markup, Own-Price Elasticity

Page Thumbnails