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Dialectical vs. Experimental Method: Marcuse's Review of Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry

Phillip Deen
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Vol. 46, No. 2, Four Pieces on Josiah Royce's Logic: Scott L. Pratt, Guest Editor, Peter H. Hare, Organizer (Spring 2010), pp. 242-257
Published by: Indiana University Press
DOI: 10.2979/tra.2011.46.2.242
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/tra.2011.46.2.242
Page Count: 16
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Dialectical vs. Experimental Method: Marcuse's Review of Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry
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Abstract

AbstractThis introduction contextualizes and evaluates Herbert Marcuse's the accompanying, previously untranslated review of John Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Marcuse's critique of pragmatism is indebted to Max Horkheimer's claim that pragmatism is an example of ““traditional”” theory and reduces thought to mere instrument in service of external ends. Unlike Horkheimer, Marcuse concedes that Dewey, unlike the logical positivists, attempted to develop a material logic of ends. However, he concludes that the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful. I place this conclusion in the context of Marcuse's critique of technological reason. Lastly, I defend Dewey from the charge of crude instrumentalism and delineate Marcuse's and Dewey's critical disagreement on science's capacity for self-reflection.

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