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Journal Article

From Judgment to Rationality: Dewey's Epistemology of Practice

Roberto Frega
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Vol. 46, No. 4 (Fall 2010), pp. 591-610
Published by: Indiana University Press
DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.2010.46.4.591
Stable URL:
Page Count: 20
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From Judgment to Rationality: Dewey's Epistemology of
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Abstract In this paper I explore John Dewey's theory of judgment and discuss its expressive dimension. I claim that Dewey's understanding of rationality depends upon a conception of thinking as being expressive, and of expressivity as being composed by logically distinct moments of articulation and transformation. I show that this expressive understanding of rationality provides the central clue for understanding Dewey's conception of inquiry. I then conclude the article by drawing some implications of Dewey's theory of judgment for a broader epistemology based upon the acknowledgment of the primacy of practice.

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