Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Philosophy and the Second Person: Peirce, Humboldt, Benveniste, and Personal Pronouns as Universals of Communication

Tullio Viola
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Vol. 47, No. 4 (Fall 2011), pp. 389-420
Published by: Indiana University Press
DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.47.4.389
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.47.4.389
Page Count: 32
  • Download ($15.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Item Type
Article
References
Philosophy and the Second Person: Peirce, Humboldt, Benveniste, and
                    Personal Pronouns as Universals of Communication
Preview not available

Abstract

Abstract In this paper I begin by considering Peirce's early fragments on personal pronouns as metaphysical categories, and I then use some consonances with the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt to construe Peirce's œœuvre as part of a tradition of studies which, halfway between philosophy and linguistics, reflects on personal pronouns as universals of human communication. Upshots of this move are, first, a new point as to the relation between Aristotle and Peirce, and the latter's quest for the universal elements of semiotic phenomena; and second, an assessment of the overall importance of the ““second-person standpoint”” in Peirce's thought.

Page Thumbnails