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This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox
Richard Kenneth Atkins
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Vol. 47, No. 4 (Fall 2011), pp. 421-444
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.47.4.421
Page Count: 24
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Liars paradox, Truth, Pragmatism, Inference, Argumentation, Paradoxes, Pragmatics, Sensory perception, Kidnapping, Subject indexing
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Abstract I have two aims in this essay. First, I shall show that Peirce rejected his 1869 solution to the Liar Paradox in 1903 but never explicitly proposed a third solution. This has yet to be noted in the literature. Second, I shall argue that if we accept Peircean theories of truth, assertion and assent, then we can avail ourselves of a novel solution to the Liar Paradox.
©© 2011 Charles S. Peirce Society