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Probability, Objectivity, and Induction
The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies
Vol. 13, No. 2 (December 2013), pp. 81-95
Published by: Penn State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jaynrandstud.13.2.0081
Page Count: 15
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The main purpose of this article is to use Ayn Rand's analysis of the meaning of objectivity to clarify the much-discussed question of whether probability is “objective” or “subjective.” This results in a classification of probability theories as frequentist, subjective Bayesian, or objective Bayesian. The work of objective Bayesian E. T. Jaynes is emphasized, and is used to provide a formal definition of probability. The relation between probability and induction is covered briefly, with probability theory presented as the basis of inductive inference.
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