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Naturalism, Causality, and Nietzsche's Conception of Science

Justin Remhof
Journal of Nietzsche Studies
Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 2015), pp. 110-119
DOI: 10.5325/jnietstud.46.1.0110
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jnietstud.46.1.0110
Page Count: 10
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Naturalism, Causality, and Nietzsche's Conception of Science
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Abstract

There is a disagreement over how to understand Nietzsche's view of science. According to what I call the Negative View, Nietzsche thinks science should be reconceived or superseded by another discourse, such as art, because it is nihilistic. By contrast, what I call the Positive View holds that Nietzsche does not think science is nihilistic, so he denies that it should be reinterpreted or overcome. Interestingly, defenders of each position can appeal to Nietzsche's understanding of naturalism to support their interpretation. I argue that Nietzsche embraces a social constructivist conception of causality that renders his naturalism incompatible with the views of naturalism attributed to him by the two dominant readings.

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