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Counterinsurgency Scorecard

Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II

Christopher Paul
Colin P. Clarke
Beth Grill
Molly Dunigan
Copyright Date: 2013
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 36
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhthj
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  • Book Info
    Counterinsurgency Scorecard
    Book Description:

    A key finding of previous RAND research on insurgencies worldwide since World War II was that an overall score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad counterinsurgency factors and practices perfectly discriminated conflicts’ historical outcomes. Using the scorecard approach and an expert elicitation (Delphi) exercise, a RAND study sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-8364-7
    Subjects: Technology, Political Science
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Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents (pp. v-vi)
  4. Tables (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Summary (pp. ix-x)
  6. Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II (pp. 1-18)

    The RAND reportPaths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies(RR-291/1-OSD) used detailed case studies of the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II (WWII) and 2010 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN).² That study produced nine key findings regarding success in COIN in modern history:

    Seventeen of 24 COIN concepts tested receive strong support; one (“crush them”) has strong evidence against it.

    Effective COIN practices run in packs, and some practices are always in the pack: tangible support reduction, commitment and motivation, and flexibility and adaptability.

    Every insurgency is unique, but not so much...

  7. APPENDIX: Details of the Expert Elicitation (pp. 19-24)
  8. References (pp. 25-26)