Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

The Unsolved German Settlement

Fred Warner Neal
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Vol. 351, The Changing Cold War (Jan., 1964), pp. 148-156
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1035230
Page Count: 9
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($40.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
The Unsolved German Settlement
Preview not available

Abstract

Three realities of the German situation must be accepted in any peaceful settlement of the short-run aspects: the division of Germany into two separate states, the rearmament of Germany, and the division of Berlin with continued presence of Western troops in West Berlin. The main dispute is over recognition of East Germany, since the Soviet and United States proposals on Berlin are close enough to be negotiable-Soviet proposals have not called for elimination of Western garrisons. The major American concern over recognition involves the West German reaction, with its possible effect on NATO. West Germany, the mainstay of the alliance, also refuses to accept East Germany and its frontiers, insisting that a reunified Germany embracing 1937 frontiers can be achieved by a "policy of strength in NATO." In considering whether the military risks of making a German settlement outweigh the military risks of not making one, major questions are (1) whether there exists a threat of Soviet military aggression against Western Europe and (2) whether NATO can long continue in its present form in any event. Although West Germany will doubtless have closer relations with the Soviet Union in the future, a "deal" involving the sacrifice of East Germany by Moscow is no longer likely. Whether a West German-Soviet rapprochement will prove deleterious to the United States depends in large part on whether the United States and the Soviet Union can reach a détente before it occurs.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
148
    148
  • Thumbnail: Page 
149
    149
  • Thumbnail: Page 
150
    150
  • Thumbnail: Page 
151
    151
  • Thumbnail: Page 
152
    152
  • Thumbnail: Page 
153
    153
  • Thumbnail: Page 
154
    154
  • Thumbnail: Page 
155
    155
  • Thumbnail: Page 
156
    156