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Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism

Earl M. Maltz
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Vol. 496, State Constitutions in a Federal System (Mar., 1988), pp. 98-106
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1046322
Page Count: 9
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Abstract

Commentators on state constitutional law have been generally critical of those state courts that follow lockstep analysis. Often these criticisms have relied heavily on the concept of federalism. This reliance is misplaced; lockstep analysis is entirely consistent with basic notions of state autonomy. Instead, it is courts using other approaches that have at times ignored the basic theory of federalism.

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