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A case is argued for a certain procedure for moral education or 'value education'. The procedure begins by (1) categorising or defining the area and then (2) establishing what must logically count as 'a good performance' within it; thereafter we should devise practical assessment-methods (3), experiments in methods of moral education (4), and hence (5) be able to offer practical recommendations. The chief obstacle to progress is a descriptive theory of morality, which bases moral education on a prior set of substantive values: that is no logical basis for any form of thought, and anyway pupils are bound to challenge them. We need rather to work out, under (1) and (2), what counts as valid moral reasoning and what items of equipment the morally educated person needs: empirical research and practical methods must follow from that.
Oxford Review of Education © 2000 Taylor & Francis, Ltd.