Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Distribution Restrictions Operate by Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan

Benjamin Klein
Supreme Court Economic Review
Vol. 7 (1999), pp. 1-58
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147086
Page Count: 58
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Distribution Restrictions Operate by Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan
Preview not available

Abstract

The Supreme Court in State Oil Company v. Khan focused on the control of "successive monopoly" problems as the sole pro-competitive rationale for maximum vertical resale price maintenance. This article shows that the circumstances that lead a manufacturer to use maximum resale price maintenance are much more complex than the presence of a negatively sloped dealer demand curve and that these more complex conditions must be considered in order to explain Khan. The analysis first demonstrates that there are important reasons other than the "classic dealer free riding" emphasized in economics and case law for why an incentive incompatibility may exist between a manufacturer and its dealers. Therefore, to enforce dealer performance distribution arrangements must create and preserve a dealer profit premium. This explains why maximum resale price maintenance is not ubiquitous and suggests that to understand Khan we must examine other pro-competitive reasons for maximum resale price maintenance. Maximum resale price maintenance was used in Khan to prevent gasoline dealers from taking advantage of the fact that regular gas sales, but not premium gas sales, are related to convenience store sales. Hence, unconstrained dealers have the incentive to shift their demand away from the supplier's higher margin premium gas towards regular gas. This analysis illustrates the difficulties courts would have if they were required to undertake a full rule of reason analysis of every distribution arrangement that used maximum resale price maintenance. Instead, the article recommends that rule of reason analysis should employ a manufacturer market power screen.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
1
    1
  • Thumbnail: Page 
2
    2
  • Thumbnail: Page 
3
    3
  • Thumbnail: Page 
4
    4
  • Thumbnail: Page 
5
    5
  • Thumbnail: Page 
6
    6
  • Thumbnail: Page 
7
    7
  • Thumbnail: Page 
8
    8
  • Thumbnail: Page 
9
    9
  • Thumbnail: Page 
10
    10
  • Thumbnail: Page 
11
    11
  • Thumbnail: Page 
12
    12
  • Thumbnail: Page 
13
    13
  • Thumbnail: Page 
14
    14
  • Thumbnail: Page 
15
    15
  • Thumbnail: Page 
16
    16
  • Thumbnail: Page 
17
    17
  • Thumbnail: Page 
18
    18
  • Thumbnail: Page 
19
    19
  • Thumbnail: Page 
20
    20
  • Thumbnail: Page 
21
    21
  • Thumbnail: Page 
22
    22
  • Thumbnail: Page 
23
    23
  • Thumbnail: Page 
24
    24
  • Thumbnail: Page 
25
    25
  • Thumbnail: Page 
26
    26
  • Thumbnail: Page 
27
    27
  • Thumbnail: Page 
28
    28
  • Thumbnail: Page 
29
    29
  • Thumbnail: Page 
30
    30
  • Thumbnail: Page 
31
    31
  • Thumbnail: Page 
32
    32
  • Thumbnail: Page 
33
    33
  • Thumbnail: Page 
34
    34
  • Thumbnail: Page 
35
    35
  • Thumbnail: Page 
36
    36
  • Thumbnail: Page 
37
    37
  • Thumbnail: Page 
38
    38
  • Thumbnail: Page 
39
    39
  • Thumbnail: Page 
40
    40
  • Thumbnail: Page 
41
    41
  • Thumbnail: Page 
42
    42
  • Thumbnail: Page 
43
    43
  • Thumbnail: Page 
44
    44
  • Thumbnail: Page 
45
    45
  • Thumbnail: Page 
46
    46
  • Thumbnail: Page 
47
    47
  • Thumbnail: Page 
48
    48
  • Thumbnail: Page 
49
    49
  • Thumbnail: Page 
50
    50
  • Thumbnail: Page 
51
    51
  • Thumbnail: Page 
52
    52
  • Thumbnail: Page 
53
    53
  • Thumbnail: Page 
54
    54
  • Thumbnail: Page 
55
    55
  • Thumbnail: Page 
56
    56
  • Thumbnail: Page 
57
    57
  • Thumbnail: Page 
58
    58