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Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
The American Economic Review
Vol. 88, No. 3 (Jun., 1998), pp. 587-597
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/116850
Page Count: 11
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Speculators, Currency, Signals, Games, Speculative attacks, Exchange rates, Short sales, Transaction costs, Economic models
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Even though self-fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge, we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals. This unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals, but also on financial variables, such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading. In contrast to multiple equilibrium models, our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks.
The American Economic Review © 1998 American Economic Association