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Joint Profit Maximization, Negotiation, and the Determinacy of Price in Bilateral Monopoly

Dale B. Truett and Lila J. Truett
The Journal of Economic Education
Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 260-270
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
DOI: 10.2307/1183126
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1183126
Page Count: 11
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Joint Profit Maximization, Negotiation, and the Determinacy of Price in Bilateral Monopoly
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Abstract

Many economists teach that joint profit maximization leads to a determinate quantity and indeterminate price of the intermediate good traded. Using isoprofit curves, the Truetts argue that only one price is consistent with rational behavior and the goal of profit maximization.

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