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Demonstrating the Possibility of Pareto Inferior Nash Equilibria

Nicolaas J. Vriend
The Journal of Economic Education
Vol. 31, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 358-362
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
DOI: 10.2307/1183149
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1183149
Page Count: 5
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Demonstrating the Possibility of Pareto Inferior Nash Equilibria
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Abstract

A simple classroom game shows students how some equilibria of games that may seem "unreasonable" can arise naturally.

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