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Sharecropping, Production Externalities, and the Theory of Contracts

James Roumasset
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Vol. 61, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), pp. 640-647
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1239911
Page Count: 8
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Sharecropping, Production Externalities, and the Theory of Contracts
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Abstract

Abstracting from transactions costs, the equilibrium bargaining solution with sufficient traders is equivalent to the Walrasian equilibrium. For a sharecropping economy, this proposition establishes the validity of the competitive theory of share tenancy. For an economy with production externalities, the same proposition serves as a nontrivial version of the Coase theorem.

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