You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Sharecropping, Production Externalities, and the Theory of Contracts
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Vol. 61, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), pp. 640-647
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1239911
Page Count: 8
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Landowners, Tenants, Economic externalities, Economic theory, Contract theory, Market equilibrium, Commercial production, Contracts, Coase theorem, Public goods
Were these topics helpful?See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
Abstracting from transactions costs, the equilibrium bargaining solution with sufficient traders is equivalent to the Walrasian equilibrium. For a sharecropping economy, this proposition establishes the validity of the competitive theory of share tenancy. For an economy with production externalities, the same proposition serves as a nontrivial version of the Coase theorem.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics © 1979 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association