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Political Action Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation

Jonathan C. Brooks, A. Colin Cameron and Colin A. Carter
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Vol. 80, No. 3 (Aug., 1998), pp. 441-454
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1244547
Page Count: 14
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Political Action Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation
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Abstract

This study examines the simultaneous relationship between Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions and congressional votes on U.S. sugar legislation. We extend the conventional analysis by specifying a three-equation system in which each congressman's vote depends on contributions received from pro-sugar and anti-sugar coalitions, while the propensity of each of these coalitions to contribute depends simultaneously on the congressman's anticipated voting decision and the contributions of the opposing coalition. Logrolling is also accommodated by considering the effect that contributions from other coalitions have had on voting decisions. We find evidence of a three-way linkage between votes and competing campaign contributions and conclude that the effectiveness of PAC contributions reflects the dominance of political pressure over ideological concerns.

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