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Economics of Antipoaching Enforcement and the Ivory Trade Ban

Erwin H. Bulte and G. Cornelis van Kooten
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Vol. 81, No. 2 (May, 1999), pp. 453-466
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1244594
Page Count: 14
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Economics of Antipoaching Enforcement and the Ivory Trade Ban
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Abstract

A model of elephant conservation that includes illegal poaching, enforcement effort, and legal culling is used to analyze enforcement and elephant populations for alternative policies, with and without legal trade in ivory. Consistent with previous theoretical models, banning trade may increase or decrease equilibrium stocks. As an empirical application, information for Zambia, along with sensitivity analysis, are used to show that the ivory trade ban is more effective in conserving the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) than in permitting open trade. However, in all situations, current elephant populations likely exceed optimal levels as perceived by the range states, and further reductions in elephant numbers might be expected.

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