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A Roll Call Analysis of the Endangered Species Act Amendments
Sayeed R. Mehmood and Daowei Zhang
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Vol. 83, No. 3 (Aug., 2001), pp. 501-512
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1245082
Page Count: 12
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Public choice economics view legislative process as a transaction in the political market. Interest groups demand regulation in their favor and lobby lawmakers. The lawmakers analyze an assortment of factors and supply legislation to the winning group, thereby maximizing their rent from the political market. This article examines Endangered Species Act (ESA) amendments from a public choice perspective. Congressional voting on the ESA amendments are assessed using a model based on political incentive and ideology. The results show that the lawmakers' voting behavior is correlated with their party affiliation, ideology, and several characteristics of their home state, such as number of endangered species, proportion of urban population, contribution of the natural resources and construction sectors in gross state product, and geographical location.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics © 2001 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association