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Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes toward Risk: An Economic Analysis

William Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga
Harvard Law Review
Vol. 86, No. 4 (Feb., 1973), pp. 693-713
DOI: 10.2307/1339944
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1339944
Page Count: 21
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Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes toward Risk: An Economic Analysis
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Abstract

The tools of economic analysis have too infrequently been applied to evaluations of the deterrent efficacy of penalties for statutory violations. The authors help remedy this deficiency by using economic analysis to examine the existing mechanisms which are used to deter antitrust violations. They point particularly to the critical importance of analyzing the risk attitudes of management in any attempt to arrive at an optimal antitrust policy, and urge the replacement of the current arsenal of antitrust weapons, insofar as they are directed at deterrence, with the unitary device of a fine based upon a percentage of corporate profits.

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