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What Kind of Knowledge Does a Weak-Willed Person Have?: A Comparative Study of Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School

Xinyan Jiang
Philosophy East and West
Vol. 50, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 242-253
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400144
Page Count: 12
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What Kind of Knowledge Does a Weak-Willed Person Have?: A Comparative Study of Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School
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Abstract

This comparative study argues that both Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School deny that a weak-willed person truly and clearly knows what is best at the time of action, but their analyses of a weak-willed person's knowledge are rather different. It is shown that both Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School believe that practical knowledge presupposes repeatedly acting on it and thus that the defect of the weak-willed person's knowledge cannot be overcome by purely cognitive training.

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